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Introduction 
Hans-Georg Gadamer's important work, Truth and Method, 
ushered in a new trend in hermeneutic thought that combined 
understanding, interpretation, and application into a dynamic 
process that all individuals experience in actions producing 
meaning. The individual was portrayed as situated in a specific 
tradition that influences the cognitions and meanings that texts and 
language use in general can contain. The central point of Gadamer's 
hermeneutic thought is that the human being is historically situated, 
and that understanding is consequently historically conditioned. It 
was this intrinsic situatedness of humans and their prejudices that 
led him to conclude, "all understanding is interpretation." 
Richard Shusterman, in his work "Beneath Interpretation," has 
recently taken issue with this stance that equates interpretation with 
understanding, arguing for a conception of "understanding" that 
resides "beneath" interpretation. Gadamer and others are said to 
collapse interpretation into understanding, thus depriving 
unders tood bodily exper iences of their p lace in the 
conceptualization of "understanding." According to Shusterman, 
all understanding does not involve interpretation. This essay will 
argue that this position advanced by Shusterman rests ultimately 
on a misconception of Gadamer's notion of interpretation, and as 
such, is not a strong challenge to Gadamer's insights concerning 
the process of human understanding. Shusterman's emphasis on 
understanding being pre-reflective and interpretation being 
conscious disavows Gadamer's analysis that they are identical in 
so far as they both refer to an individual's situatedness in tradition 
and its concurrent impacts on the production of meaning. In order 
to demonstrate how this is so, this essay will first examine some of 
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Shusterman's key arguments and conceptualizations in regard to 
the "hermeneutic universalism" espoused by individuals such as 
Gadamer. The ways that the Gadamerian notion of understanding 
can be maintained in light of Shusterman's critique will be 
illustrated. In all, Gadamer's notion of understanding will be shown 
to highlight the role of the traditional "prejudices" always given to 
the subject that inform his or her acts of understanding; this 
"substratum" to any act of understanding/interpretation will in turn 
be seen to facilitate the acts of understanding Shusterman points to 
as counterexamples. 
Shusterman on Understanding and Interpretation 
Shusterman's argument aims at establishing a ground of 
understanding that rests beneath the level of cognitive interpretation. 
In his essay, "Beneath Interpretation," Shusterman refutes six 
arguments that the hermeneutic universalist (such as Gadamer) 
present in arguing that all understanding is interpretation. The 
fourth and fifth arguments are of particular interest to this inquiry, 
since they address the selective and active nature of interpretation. 
Shusterman attempts to show that these arguments are faulty in 
that they do not demonstrate that understanding as active/selective 
follows from an identical sense of interpretation as active/selective. 
Instead, he indicates that this establishes the ground for a new 
conceptualization of these two terms. 
Shusterman points out that an important hermeneutic argument 
is that "since all understanding is selective—focused on some things 
and features but not others—all understanding must therefore be 
interpretive." The aspects of incompleteness and purposive 
orientation are indicated as prime culprits in the in the ultimate 
perspectivity of understanding, thus rendering it the same as 
interpretation. Interpretation, as Shusterman previously notes, is 
constituted by differing perspectives and certain purposes, and 
hence is seen as "grasp[ing that]" which "depends in part on its 
antecedent purposes." The hermeneutic universalist finds that all 
understanding, like interpretation, is motivated by purpose and a 
certain perspective of the subject. 
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It is at this point that Shusterman disagrees with the conflation 
of understanding with interpretation. He "challenge[s] the inference 
that since understanding (or indeed any intelligent activity) is always 
selective, it is therefore always interpretation." This is claimed to 
be an instance of John Dewey's "intellectualist" fallacy, which 
argues that it is overly reductionistic to equate intelligent human 
activity to overt acts of intellectual consciousness. Shusterman 
counters this trend by suggesting that many daily activities one 
undertakes are "intelligent," but lack any in-depth interpretation. 
For instance, where to place one's feet on a staircase or on the 
sidewalk are intelligent activities toward some goal that do not 
rely on overt, conscious processes of deliberation. Additionally, 
he provides the example of his awakening on the beach of Santa 
Cruz and immediately perceiving or understanding it is daytime 
due to the bright sunshine. He summarizes this position by stating, 
I am arguing that though all understanding is selective, 
not all selective understanding is interpretive. If 
understanding's selection is neither conscious nor 
deliberate but prereflective and immediate, we have no 
reason to regard that selection or the resultant 
understanding as interpretation, since interpretation 
standardly implies some deliberate or at least conscious 
thinking, whereas understanding does not. 
The response Shusterman provides to this line of thinking already 
prefaces his conceptualization of understanding as beneath the 
active forces of interpretation. 
Related to this argument is the hermeneutic position that since 
all understanding is active, it is interpretation. Shusterman sees 
such a line of thought in thinkers such as Nietzsche and Gadamer. 
Relying on physiological activity in the mere reception of stimuli, 
Shusterman finds that these thinkers posit all understanding as 
activity, and that this warrants the judgment that all understanding 
is interpretation. This argument, according to Shusterman, "relies 
on an implicit premise that all 'doings' that are cognitively valuable 
or significant for thought are themselves already cases of thinking." 
Instead, this presupposition is rejected in favor of understanding's 
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activity being based in non-thought involving act ivi t ies . 
Shusterman provides an example yet again from the sunny climes 
of Santa Cruz, indicating that when someone tells him "the surf is 
up" while he is on the way to the beach, no need for interpretation 
exists. It is "only if there where some problem in understanding, 
some puzzle or doubt or incongruity, would I have to thematize the 
utterance as something that needed interpretation, something to 
think about and clarify or resolve." While Shusterman continues 
on to answer the challenge to this position that all experience is 
linguistically conditioned, his point is clear; understanding should 
be conceived of as involving intelligent activities that are different 
from the reflective act of understanding. 
It is at this point that some of the general distinctions between 
Shusterman's conceptions of understanding and interpretation can 
be broached. Understanding is seen as that which "initially grounds 
and guides interpretation, while the later explores, validates, or 
modifies that initial ground of meaning." Understanding is thus 
portrayed as the unconscious but intelligent action that is occurring 
in non-reflective acts of linguistic comprehension or immediate 
sensuous intuition, whereas "interpretation" is said to be a better 
label for the "conscious and problem-solving character" of 
interpretative activity. Shusterman indicates that while "both are 
inevitably perspectival, interpretive activity seems intrinsically 
aware that alternative interpretations may be given to resolve a 
problem, while understanding can be unreflectively blind to the 
existence or possibility of alternative understandings, since it can 
be unaware of any problem of understanding that might present 
alternative solutions." Drawing on the insights of Wittgenstein, 
Shusterman seems to be arguing that the reflective dimension of 
consciousness is the primary criterion by which understanding 
should be distinguished from interpretation. Highlighting that 
certain intelligent activities are prereflective, Shusterman extends 
Wittgenstein's notion of behavioral training in specific "game" 
contexts as accounting for the grounding of understanding that 
underlies interpretation. Shusterman indicates that "Understanding, 
on the other hand, does not require linguistic articulation. A proper 
reaction, a shudder or tingle, may be enough to indicate one has 
understood," whereas interpretation aims at translating linguistic 
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expressions into other meaningful ones. Gadamer's notion of all 
understanding being interpretation is hence challenged, since some 
understanding is seen as putatively non-interpretative and 
unconscious. 
Gadamerian Responses to Shusterman 
Gadamer's analysis of understanding as interpretation can be 
defended from Shus te rman ' s cr i t ic ism. Looking at his 
conceptualization in Truth and Method, one notices that Shusterman 
is mistaking what Gadamer's project is accomplishing; Shusterman 
is arguing that the common notion of interpretation is radically 
different from the non-conscious but cognitively valuable operations 
he highlights, whereas Gadamer is postulating that the factors of 
activity and selectivity are constitutive of historical being. Thus, 
the understanding of such a being is the same as interpretation, 
with each instance of such understanding/interpretation differing 
in how much temporal distance is crossed, for example, in reading 
an ancient text or a contemporary conversation. This section will 
defend Gadamer's position against Shusterman's critique by 
drawing from the discussions of prejudices and historical effect/ 
application resident in Truth and Method. 
Shusterman 's conception of understanding as beneath 
interpretation holds it as an unconscious, yet cognitively valuable 
act. Thus, Gadamer's notion of interpretation and understanding 
being equivalent is challenged. Shusterman's argument, however, 
relies on the premise that interpretation must be a conscious and 
reflective event. While this concurs with common parlance of this 
term, it misses the thrust of Gadamer's claims—the very core of 
meaning is produced by the individual in relation to his or her 
situatedness. Whether this production and schematizing is called 
by the words "understanding" or "interpretation," the same point 
of selection and activity from a specific perspective is implied. A 
key notion in this historical situatedness is the subject ' s 
"prejudices." These tendencies toward "prejudgment" stem from 
an individual's place in a specific tradition. This leads Gadamer to 
pronounce, "Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective 
act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of 
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transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated." 
Thus, the individual is not to be looked at as simply an absorber of 
incoming stimuli, but as a participant wading deeply in the midst 
of a tradition. 
This tradition is conveyed not only through conscious 
interaction on the part of the individual, as Shusterman appears to 
imply, but is also often pre-reflective. In a similar vein, Gadamer 
notes that understanding (equivalent to interpretation in his view) 
can be non-reflective; he argues, "Long before we understand 
ourselves through a process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in 
which we live." These pre-conscious elements are key to any act 
of understanding/interpretation; contra Shusterman, Gadamer 
refrains from equating interpretation with conscious activity 
because that would reify a relatively minor element. He indicates, 
"The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the 
closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the 
individual, far more that his [sic] judgments, constitute the 
historical reality of his being." The prejudicial structure of 
understanding is the important aspect, not the mere consciousness 
or self-awareness of any particular individual. The socialization, 
linguistic culture, and tradition that the individual finds him or 
herself occupying all lead to the conscious and unconscious 
assignment of meaning, hence understanding. To use Shusterman's 
example, it is the tradition of verbal and nonverbal communication 
that he finds in himself that leads to the recognition of the phrase 
"the surf is up" and his consequential response. While he does not 
cogitate overtly on the meaning of the semantic units of this 
utterance, he does recognize and understand its meaning through 
his immersion in a language and cultural tradition. What he 
discounts as Wittgensteinian training and pre-ref lect ive 
understanding, Gadamer rightly finds as still interpretive because 
it involves prejudices from a particular tradition in order for it to 
hold meaning for the specific individual addressed. Shusterman 
need only say this same utterance to an Australian Aborigine to 
see if it is understood. While such a counterexample may seem 
unfair to Shusterman's position (as he accepts the role of culture 
and linguistic socialization), it does fairly point out the role of the 
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traditional prejudices in assigning meaning. Whether it is a complex 
novel or a routine utterance, Gadamer argues that one's historical 
situatedness is key in the meanings that are evident or available. 
Whether it involves deliberation and self-consciousness misses 
Gadamer's point; the important aspect is the role of tradition in 
influencing the creation of meaning by an individual participating 
in that very tradition. 
The previous response began to touch upon another aspect to 
Gadamer's thought that Shusterman fails to address—the integral 
part that subjective positioning plays in interpretation. The 
individual, through prejudices and location in a tradition, finds him 
or herself conditioned by the past; Gadamer notes, "in all 
understanding, whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the 
efficacy of history is at work." This "history of effect" or "effective 
history" is an important concept in Truth and Method and can be 
applied to the defense of Gadamer against Shusterman's criticism. 
The past does influence the future and the ways that the future 
looks at the past. To the "beach bum" looking for waves to surf, 
the historical use of language and behavior effects what meanings 
are addressed now and how those meanings may remain open to 
future change. Gadamer notes that "Understanding is, essentially, 
a historically effected event" and by doing so acknowledges the 
traditional aspect to the very conception of meaning. When one 
understands a past text or communicative utterance, one seeks its 
meaning in application to the present. For instance, Gadamer refers 
to the case of legal and theological interpretation, stating, "This 
implies that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood 
properly—i.e., according to the claim it makes—must be understood 
at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different 
way. Understanding here is always application." The reason why 
understanding of any sort involves application is because it is 
initiated by an individual saturated by and within a tradition, which 
in turn confronts an object (i.e., text) that is also immersed in 
tradition. 
Shusterman's examples of linguistic utterances and the piercing 
rays of the sun on the Santa Cruz beach both illustrate not his point 
that understanding and interpretation are different, but instead that 
they are both aligned toward the production of meaning with a 
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sense of present application. The individual approaching the beach 
"understands" the utterance from the fellow individual since he or 
she is mired in tradition and orients him or herself toward present 
meaning; the "text" of the utterance is seen as possessing meaning 
because its interpretation involves application to the present 
situation of the individual approaching the beach. What Shusterman 
counts as radically different from Gadamer's analysis, actually 
supports the hermeneutic universalist position. The "pre-reflective" 
status of the understanding of the approaching surfer does not show 
that understanding is beneath interpretation, but instead that it is 
equivalent with this concept in that they both point toward the same 
practice—the effect of historical situatedness on an individual's 
meaning-making activities. The other example of sunshine striking 
Shusterman and making him immediately "aware" that he was in 
Santa Cruz and not Berlin also illustrates this point; the meaning 
of such stimuli come not from their mere occurrence, but instead 
from the individual qua traditionary influences assigning them 
meaning. To speak of one as "understanding" sunshine striking 
his or her eyes relies on a very shallow notion of understanding; 
instead, what one understands or interprets are the implications 
(near and far) of this "fact"—i.e., one must still be in a sunny 
location, he or she is laying on my back, it is day, etc. Notice that 
this sense of understanding can be either reflective or unreflective, 
and that it involves the application of some encountered object 
(text, phenomenon, utterance) to an individual's current situation. 
Gadamer's position still withstands the counterexamples and 
arguments of Shusterman—the important aspect to understanding 
and interpretation is that it is stationed in tradition and always 
involves application to a subject's current situation. 
While Gadamer's arguments for the saturation of experience 
by language can also meet Shusterman's objections, this line of 
thought has been explicated elsewhere. What is important is the 
imposed criterion of consciousness/reflection that Shusterman uses 
to differentiate understanding from interpretation; this imposition 
ignores the key insight of Gadamer's thought, which is the 
application and situatedness of understanding/interpretation. By 
separating these two concepts and calling for one (understanding) 
to be used as the "given" data for reflective interpretation, 
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Shusterman fails to see that unconscious or conscious productions 
of meaning occur situated in tradition and involve application to a 
concrete present, such as a conversational partner headed toward 
the beach. The sense of "understanding" that Shusterman advances 
only avoids these Gadamerian insights by being so non-cognitive 
that it loses the notion of understanding. If one's trained behavior 
of stepping down a flight of stairs or of attaining a certain posture 
compromises instances of "understanding," the term begins to lose 
its connotation of meaning. One's footwork or stance are not 
meanings as much as they are actions that can be linguistically 
evaluated. For instance, a dancer only understands that his or her 
posture is correct by knowing what it means in relation to past 
performances, present success, theory of balance, etc. At one point, 
when Shusterman argues that "Understanding, on the other hand, 
does not require linguistic articulation. A proper reaction, a shudder 
or tingle, may be enough to indicate one has understood," one 
wonders what sense of "understanding" is invoked in mere bodily 
movements. Notice that this example, congruent with current 
nonverbal communication research, states that these bodily 
movements can "indicate" understanding, but are not constitutive 
of understanding. What is understood or interpreted in this example 
is the meaning of these bodily reactions; one is applying a certain 
action in the immediate past to the present state of the conversation 
and its future directions. While Shusterman has brought up some 
interesting criticisms of Gadamer's position, his distinction between 
understanding and interpretation fails to hold as it avoids Gadamer's 
key insights—the meaning produced by an individual is conditioned 
by the activity/selectivity engendered by his or her placement in a 
tradition and its consequent prejudices. 
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